An important issue not well resolved (and it won't be here, although I wish to advance it a step or two) is the matter of the ethical demands on us to:
1) tolerate the intolerant;
2) tolerate intolerance.
2) tolerate intolerance.
They are quite distinct.
The three ethical traditions are, in their simplest form, about ethical judgment based upon (1) character (2) intention (3) outcome. I take this brief moment to be didactic for this reason: the third ethical tradition -- the one in which utilitarianism, for example, is situated -- says the ethical value of an action must account for its outcomes, its effects.
Tolerate the intolerant:
For a host of reasons, we can never be sure that our evaluation of others is not biased and distorted. So those we view as intolerant may not be in any objective sense. Further, the world changes and most of us understand this (except for religious fundamentalists) so what may be a very unpopular opinion today may actually be acceptable, even essential to our survival, tomorrow.
An argument can be made that a free society must tolerate the intolerant. We must make room for religious fanatics, racists, sexists, zealots of all sorts. We must protect their voice. (We must protect their right to speak -- we must not force anyone to listen to them -- a confusion of the radical right.) To tolerate the intolerant -- to give them a seat at the table, a plate of food, a vote -- seems to pass the character test (we give the same dignity to others as we wish for ourselves). It passes the intention test -- we intend to offer equality of opportunity to all. I has a tougher time against the oucomes test (by giving the KKK a parade permit, we may do harm to someone.) By passing two and potentially failing one ethical tradition's test, we give tentative approval to the principle that we must tolerate the intolerant.
Tolerate intolerance:
It is very important to distinguish tolerating the intolerant from tolerating intolerance. To tolerate is to advance the social value that tolerance must take place even when the costs to the tolerater is higher than the benefit. (Even when I am repulsed by theocrats who would say terrible things about my gay family and friends, I must not oppress the intolerant theocrats.)
But must I tolerate their intolerance? On the face of it, and I think once we probe more deeply, no. Tolerating the intolerant -- giving them voice and a place at the table -- is not at all the same thing as tolerating their intolerance. If the social value is that I must tolerate them, the reciprocal is true: they must tolerate me. I must grant the religious fundamentalist the right to say his scripture criticizes sexuality or mixed fabrics or shaving or whatever else Ecclesiastes might offer up (and there is plenty -- much of it fodder for the modern secularist) -- but that fundamentalist is out of line when he tries to invade the civic sphere and impose his beliefs on me (seeks to regulate my behavior).
What of so-called intolerance toward intolerance? There is really no legitimate logical category here, although many seem to think so. The university, with special obligations to open discourse, is often criticized for showing intolerance to intolerance -- but that is in fact its job: promote tolerance while promoting critical and skeptical reception for all new (non-disproved) ideas. What the university must not do is (1) above -- show intolerance to the intolerant. That is, to their person, or to their rights as people. This includes the right to speak out. Universities must protect the right of minority views to be expressed, but not in any way condone the views, expressed, especially if they are themselves intolerant.
Note that no one is obliged to listen to the intolerant -- or to anyone -- speak. Leave the speaking hall empty, if you please. But don't block his right to speak.
But even here there is a caveat. When is it ethical to block a speaker? By the third tradition, it is ethically compelling to block a speaker who may cause harm: say one who advocates violence against some identifiable group in the university or surrounding community. This has to be exercised with great care, but this ethical duty does exist.
It is slightly outside this discussion, but universities have one more obligation: to allocate their scarce resources most effectively. Their scarce speaker monies and scarce university facilities need to be managed to best advance the mission of the university. Discourse in the university is supposed to meet a higher standard of evidence and rhetoric and respectfulness than in ordinary civic discourse. A university should not fall prey to inviting the most popular or most exciting speakers -- but those who have met the highest standards of scholarship and can raise the level of discourse on their campuses. Universities have the right and obligation, both, to turn away speakers who are popular because of their political positions but who have not demonstrated scholarly capacity and discipline. Those speakers have plenty of other outlets in our fact-free and logic-free society.
Of course, universities should protect the right of unpopular but scholarly speakers from speaking when vocal student groups are intolerant of them or even their point of view (separate, as above). But if the speaker is himself espousing intolerance, it is a judgment call, as the outcomes (ethics) argument gives them at least one ethical leg of the stool to sit on. This is the grey area that has so many incensed and confused. There is no iron clad rule -- and certainly none following directly from the First Amendment, as much as the lazy would like -- to resolve this conflict.
Bottom line:
It is arguable that we should try to tolerate the intolerant (as people), but we must decline to tolerate intolerance in all people who wish to participate in our society, especially when the form of that intolerance could do harm.
Universities have no faux First Amendment obligation to allow anyone to speak on their campuses. In the civic sphere, everyone not inciting violence or espousing intolerance has the right to speak (but not necessarily to be heard.) In academic life, a higher standard holds. Universities have the right and indeed the obligation to raise the level of discourse and encourage their students to engage with the highest levels of public intellectualism or scholarship they can attract. A political litmus test on those potential speakers who meet those higher standards is not appropriate, however; insuring that quality ideas and arguments advanced and received with tolerance and without violence can be heard by those who wish to hear them is a duty, however, that should be fulfilled.
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